The Turmoil of Tangshan
150 km from Beijing on the Bohai rim sits an industrial city most Americans have likely never heard of called Tangshan. For many years, Tangshan was an industrial powerhouse in China and claims China’s first modern coal mine and standard gauge railway back in the late 1800s. However as one of China’s first coal mining sites due to its proximity to Beijing, by the mid-1950s the dream was over. Tangshan had exhausted its precious coal resource and what remained was a ghost of its former glory and a scene of environmental devastation and pollution. The former coal mine was shut up and left as a 28 km2, scarred, toxic subsidence plot, part of which was turned into an open-air landfill. To make matters worse, the rapid rise of the city throughout the first half of the 20th century had spurred large-scale growth and led to an influx of population [1].
With the city already struggling to branch out and leverage its coal prosperity for new industry in the era of Maoist politics, Tangshan suffered a critical blow on July 28, 1976 when a magnitude 7.8 earthquake rocked the area. The rapidly built city lacked safe structures, and as result, the official numbers indicate that 242,429 people were killed. Unofficial sources believe the number to be up to three times the official figure, but either makes it the largest earthquake in terms of loss of life in the century [2]. The massive quake left the city in ruins, the clearing of which added heaps of new rubble and garbage to the subsidence area left by the coal mine. Thus the already painful scar on the city’s face grew even more hideous at the sight of both environmental destruction and social ruin occasioned by the earthquake.
The disaster left Tangshan with two options: scrap the city and continue using it as a dump while rebuilding elsewhere or clean up and try to recover what was lost. Thankfully, the government chose the latter and adopted the phoenix as its symbol. Like the mythical bird, the city was resolved to rise from the ashes (or in this case rubble) and once more gain prominence and beauty. Meetings were held between politicians, scholars, and other city leaders to determine the correct, “scientific, and harmonious” path of development for Tangshan. The result was what the official publication calls “transforming the disadvantage into advantage” and “changing wastes into valuables” [1].
Over several years, the government and citizens of Tangshan removed much of the rubble from the subsidence area, essentially re-excavating the plot left by the coal mine. Much of the rubble from the earthquake was bulldozed into a large mound atop which soil was placed creating a new hill in the subsidence plot. The remainder was dredged and lined with rocks to form a lake. Around this new area, dubbed “South Lake,” trees were planted and a winding footpath was created. Atop the hill, trees, grass, and shrubs were placed along with a pavilion looking out over the new park and the city of Tangshan. Dubbed “Phoenix Pavilion” in honor of the bird that inspired the project, this became the centerpiece of the new recreational area and supposedly provides spectacular views of the city [1].
The park is now home to several introduced fish species, several migratory birds that appreciate the new resting place, and, of course, both tourists and residents. The city is very proud that its work has garnered it multiple awards including the “China Habitat Environment Award,” Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment,” “National Urban Wetland Park,” “National Demonstration Base of Ecological Culture,” and the UN-Habitat Best Practices Award [1].
As far as the story of reclaiming this former mining land, the official publications do not give much more detail, at least in English, and as they are my primary source, I am at a loss for the answers to some questions I have regarding this reclamation. I would hope that in light of the international acclaim the site has garnered (I frankly don’t put a lot of stock in the Chinese government awards) that Tangshan managed the reclamation work in smart and environmentally sensitive ways, but cannot find evidence to support this. What I specifically mean is that I found no reference to any sort of remediation of soil, groundwater, or the surrounding environment of South Lake during the restoration process. Open-pit mining leach toxic components into soil and water from acid washes from the mining process mixed with heavy metals stripped from the ore. This is enough to warrant remediation in Europe and the US before a site, known as a brownfield for it environmental contamination, can be used for an urban center as has happened in Tangshan. Open-pit landfills in the US are also considered brownfields and require substantial work before they can be turned into parks as decomposing matter in the landfill produces more toxic substances that infiltrate soil and water. Even sealed sanitary landfills in the US must undergo rigorous monitoring and occasional remediation before they can be transformed into parkland. I imagine that the regulations in China, especially when this project was begun over a decade ago, are not as stringent as in the US. However, given that this city is being held up as a model of environmental design and transforming a blight on the urban environment into a benefit, I would hate for it to be promoting poor environmental practices that could endanger the lives of public citizens. If, for example, the soil at the bottom of South Lake were full of toxins and heavy metals, fish caught in the lake would contain these substances in higher than normal concentrations and pass them on to the humans eating them. Now I’m not alleging this to be occurring—I have no idea—I’m just stating that there is not enough information in the official literature from which I have drawn my summary to know whether this is the actuality or whether, as I hope to be true, the city thoroughly tested and remediated soil and water in the South Lake area prior to revitalizing it. Furthermore, I hope that the UN at least was privy to such information before awarding the city with the Best Practices Award.
Whether or not Tangshan thoroughly managed the environmental aspects of its South Lake project, the idea of taking a scene of destruction and turning it into the centerpiece of a revitalized city is an important lesson for many developing nations. It is an all-too-common occurrence that these nations build power plants or centers of industry in the center of the city, thereby disrupting the urban fabric. When cities reach the point where they banish these industrial centers to the outskirts of town, as inevitably seems to happen, they then have the opportunity to follow the example of Tangshan in creating a vibrant urban center around which the city can continue to grow and embrace the new public space.
The latter point above is the second half of Tangshan’s story and the reason I have included it in this series about eco-cities. The city of Tangshan was not satisfied with the acclaim it garnered from its rehabilitation of the old mining facility and decided, under the national government’s patronage, to create an “eco-city” around the new South Lake area. The plan calls for a 104 km2 area including the South Lake area to be transformed into a sustainable economic center for a 900,000 person town. The plan is to be modeled on the Ruhr area of Germany and feature a continuous eco-corridor, loose ecological development around a river and the Caopo Reservoir wetland area to the east, and high-tech service industries and research in the rest of the new district, dubbed the Nanhu eco-city [3, 4]. The new project will develop only 32 km2 of the site while leaving the remaining 72 km2 for nature with eco-friendly pedestrian paths. Housing in the new district will be more ecologically-friendly than typical Chinese developments by implementing green (vegetated) roofs, rainwater storage and reuse, biofiltration of runoff, and waste separation with a vacuum system [4].
The site of the Nanhu eco-city was shortlisted for the joint China-Singapore Eco-City project that eventually ended up in Tianjin. However after losing out on that investment, the city signed up with Singaporean development company Yanlord to develop the residential area of Nanhu. The developer claims the site is excellent given the eco-scenic area at its heart and its close proximity to Tangshan’s central business district [5]. Building on the success of the South Lake restoration, the goal is to create a thriving community with high-end residential apartments, a youth sports complex and public park, and, of course, the ecological area of South Lake.
Reflecting on the details of the development I’ve been able to find, what concerns me is the application of the word “eco-city” to a development that seems to be slightly greener apartments around a reclaimed area. While certainly it incorporates more environmental features and ecological space than the standard Chinese development, using the term “eco-city” seems a misnomer in the absence of stronger guidelines on planning, transportation, building consumption and waste production, and emissions auditing. Compared to the Dongtan plan I presented in Chapter 1 of this series, Tangshan falls far short of the eco-city mark. When compared to the idea of an eco-city proposed by Richard Register or Peter Head, Tangshan fails to live up to the standard by not incorporating holistic accounting of its impact on the environment. A few acres of green space and wetlands does not count as an eco-city or a low-carbon city, but unfortunately, Tangshan seems to be indicative of a broader trend toward just this mode of thinking among China’s planners. Both Lu Jianqiang and Grace Ng have discussed this trend emerging among Chinese cities to jump on the eco-city bandwagon by slapping a few solar panels or green technologies around a park and calling the development a “low-carbon eco-city” or a “model of circular economy” [6, 7].
From my interviews and research, it seems as though this trend stems from two conflicting ideas coming from the Central Government. First, the government has taken an active stance on carbon emissions declaring the need for strong emissions reductions and a shift to a circular economy, or a model whereby waste is used as raw material for other products and projects and nothing is wasted. This mandate has translated into requirements at the local level for officials to reduce emissions and improve energy efficiency—their promotion and tenure depends on it. Yet simultaneously, there is not enough guidance from the Central Government on how to achieve the required reductions. In fact, if you read through the policies, you will find that targets are not often set for reductions, and strategies come in the form of a litany of areas for improvement, e.g. building energy efficiency, improved production methods, and phasing out “backwards” technology. Solid strategies and targets are deferred to later decisions and policies, though in the meantime, government officials are expected to implement the framework in place. The result of these two trends is that local officials need to reduce emissions but are not given adequate education on how. Therefore, they grab on to the most visible thing they can in an attempt to appear to the central government as though they are implementing the laws—remember, their job depends on this. Since Dongtan, those visible measures have been creating eco-cities and eco-industrial areas. But since local officials do not know how to do this, they get a developer who will build a “greener” building than what exists cheaply (because economics also factors into the promotion equation) and label it as an eco-city. Increasing green cover makes them look more ecologically sensitive, when in fact it may in the end spread cities out more and contribute to increased emissions from transportation around the new green area.
In this sense, Tangshan’s eco-development may be simply a manifestation of this trend. It may be a “greener” residential development around a park meant to appear as an eco-city for the sake of a politician’s career. Being optimistic though, I could say that since Singaporean developers tend to be more environmentally conscious, the Nanhu development may contribute to a more ecologically-friendly Tangshan overall. However whether it deserves the label of eco-city or not, another startling trend is expressed by Tangshan that must be considered when measuring any new eco-city. This trend is the one toward green exclusion, as Catherine Wong Mei Ling dubs it. The idea here is that these eco-developments are so costly that they can only be afforded by the wealthy who are willing to pay more to feel good about their environmentally-friendly lifestyle. With regard to Nanhu, she remarks that the high-end residential space coupled with boutique malls and retail proposed by Yanlord and Ho Bee, the developers, is exactly the type of development which caters to the elite rather than the masses [8]. I think Catherine is right in saying that a truly sustainable city must incorporate all sectors of the population—if not, what kind of model can it be for the rest of society? Therefore, perhaps by this metric as well, Nanhu and Tangshan cannot be dubbed truly sustainable. Still, though perhaps not an eco-city, Tangshan may be a step in the right direction for a China that still sees the majority of its buildings failing to meet minimum energy and performance standards. Only time will be the judge of its true sustainability.
Starting Fresh in Caofeidian
Not far from Tangshan City lies a small alluvial island created by the build-up of sediment over thousands of years, not unlike Dongtan. However, the difference here is that this island, called Caofeidian (sow-fay-dee-ahn for those not familiar with Chinese pronunciations) is even more unique in that it sits on a continental shelf that dives quickly away from the coast to depths suitable for a deep water shipping port without having to dredge the ocean floor. This is rare to find and was the ideal draw for Tangshan to invest and create a new industrial hub that it could claim as part of its jurisdiction. To this end, the last few years have seen massive and rapid development in the Caofeidian region, bringing in all manner of steel, chemical, oil, and other industrial companies to bring prosperity to the region and take advantage of the natural conditions. Perhaps influenced by its sister city Tianjin to the north (a project I will cover in two posts), Caofeidian was created with a strict plan carving the coast into districts for many industries in an attempt to diversify the economy. One of these industrial bases was a green industry base in the form of an eco-city [9].
Perhaps again motivated by its loss of the Singapore deal that went to Tianjin, Tangshan set out for an international partner through an open master planning competition which yielded proposals from Chinese and international firms. Ultimately, Sweco, a Swedish architecture and planning firm, was selected to partner with Tsinghua University in Beijing on the master plan for the region and the major building architecture. Building on the partnership with the Swedish company, the Swedish government signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development (MoHURD) to turn Caofeidian into a national demonstration city with the goal of creating a zero carbon society powered by renewable energy and waste heat from the nearby industrial centers [10]. To strengthen the international partnership, Tangshan’s sister city Malmo entered into an agreement to share technology and best practices in October of 2010 [11].
The plan drawn up by Tsinghua and Sweco is to create a completely carbon neutral 30 km2 area to house 1 million people who will work both in the eco-city and in the surrounding industrial areas. 95% of the city’s energy will come from renewable sources while also incorporating waste heat from the steel and coal plants in the nearby industrial area [12]. Taking advantage of the deep water port, air conditioning will be provided by waste cold water from liquid natural gas plants and ships in the area. In a move also reminiscent of Tianjin, Caofeidian is being developed on an area formerly occupied by industrial plants but since abandoned making it a brownfield site that will be remediated for the development. After remediation, the area along the coastline will be transformed into an ecological preservation area and wetland to incorporate consideration of sensitive habitat into the master plan. This remediation coupled with the new development is estimated to cost 102.7 billion yuan (15.4 billion USD) financed in part by both governments, private investment, and the steel plants providing the wast water for heating [13].
Adding to its environmental credentials, the industries around Caofeidian which will be contributing to the city have also pledged to ensure that 99.5% of solid waste and 97.5% of waste water are properly recycled. These numbers will be verified by an environmental watchdog in the country and will likely be heralded as examples of a recycled economy in the Chinese press [14]. Furthermore, to engage the public, a 20,000 m2 sustainability center will be set up to teach residents and visitors about renewable energy and sustainability in the urban environment. It will be climate neutral and entirely self sufficient and exhibit Swedish environmental engineering achievements [11]. However the most impressive part of this project is its adoption of the key performance indicator framework at the master planning level as proposed in the Dongtan project. Sweco and Tsinghua have drawn up indicators in seven subsystems which cover 141 separate items covering the functions, buildings, transport, and energy use in the city as well as solid and water waste and public space. The indicators specify requirements in planning, construction, and operation of sites in an attempt to holistically control every aspect of the city to ensure its success [15]. These indicators have already given rise to a whole suite of technologies being slated for incorporation into the city including two dikes to manage storms and waves from the ocean, light rail and bus rapid transit, wind turbines, organic biogas for transportation, waste incineration, and greywater reuse [16]. Several Swedish companies have already signed on to provide these systems and the first 80,000 m2 of housing has been launched with homeowners from the nearby enterprises already taking ownership. These buildings already incorporate solar energy and geothermal heating and cooling [17].
Compared to its neighbor Tangshan, Caofeidian holds much more promise for becoming the eco-city model that China seeks for several reasons. The first and perhaps most important is the formation of a KPI framework from the beginning of the project. As I discussed in my post on Dongtan, these indicators can shape a project from the planning stage through completion no matter what developer approaches the problem. They ensure that minimum standards of construction and efficiency are met so that central systems such as photovoltaic energy, district cooling, and geothermal heating do not have to compensate for poor design. Design is the stage where buildings can gain the most through smart choices and incorporation of passive elements such as daylighting and natural ventilation. These passive strategies reduce demand without costing more or demanding any energy at all thereby obviating the need for more expensive active design elements. Active technologies such as photovoltaic panels typically have a higher cost and do nothing to reduce demand—they only offset it. KPIs are the way to ensure that subsequent firms beyond Sweco do not remove these passive strategies in an attempt to cut costs.
Another factor that provides hope that Caofeidian may succeed where Dongtan has thus far failed is the cooperation between the Swedish government and the Chinese government. In discussing Dongtan, I wrote about the need for multiple stakeholders at every level of governance and involvement to ensure that should one bow out or run into difficulty, another was in place to step up and support the project. The issue of multilevel diversity in the support network is key because, for example, a business or architect, no matter how devoted they are to the project, cannot fulfill the same role as the government—this was the case in Dongtan’s scenario. However for Caofeidian there is a much larger and more varied network of stakeholders across each level, as shown in the chart below.
| Level of Support | Swedish Stakeholder | Chinese Stakeholder |
| National Government | Swedish Government | MoHURD |
| Regional Government | City of Malmo | Tangshan City Government, Hebei Provincial Goverment |
| Master Planning | Sweco | Tsinghua University, Chinese Academy of Urban Planning |
| Architecture | Sweco and 40 other Swedish firms | Tsinghua University |
| Technology Provider | Swedish Embassy representing more than a dozen companies | Wind turbines, solar hot water, and PV being provided by local manufacturers |
| Financier | Swedish government | Tangshan government, steel manufacturers |
What is evident from this chart that was absent in the case of Dongtan is that at each level there is at least one stakeholder on both the Chinese and Swedish side. Though the Swedish government obviously does not have the same power over the city and the necessary regulations as the Chinese government does, they have the ability to engage the Chinese side in a way businesses cannot should there be a hiccup in the project at that level. Having such a strong network across multiple levels of involvement and governance is the best way to overcome problems and bumps in the road to a successful project.
The last factor which gives me hope for this project is its integration into the overall master plan of Caofeidian. Whereas Dongtan was essentially a standalone project, Caofeidian’s eco-city is building on infrastructure provided by the nearby port and steel industries. Using these sources of heat and cold (in engineering, cold is the absence of heat, so it’s more appropriate to say a heat sink), the cost of building the eco-city is reduced thereby overcoming the number one objection to developments of this type. These technologies also show an adaptation of environmentally-friendly design to the local conditions—a critical step in achieving a sustainable city. It would be easy enough to ignore the existing infrastructure and generate heat and power with solar or wind energy, but to do so would increase the cost and miss out on a huge advantage of the site. If there is a technological lesson to be learned from Caofeidian, it is that each city must consider its unique location and the environmental and commercial surroundings to see where synergies can be created to reduce costs and improve efficiencies. That the planners on both the Swedish and Chinese sides have already considered this gives me hope that Caofeidian can become an example of best practices for good urban development.
Unfortunately, I am not optimistic that the eco-tendencies of Sweco’s development will permeate the surrounding heavy industry but rather be contained to the limits of the eco-city project. The feeling I get from the development being incorporated into the industrial plan is that for the government and the local leaders it is another plank for diversifying and boosting the economy. Just as they have chemical, steel, and oil industries here they also have a center for the “green” industry, and to attract those companies, they are housing them in a “green” development. This is a bit pessimistic—certainly the government claims this to be a model project for the remainder of the cities, but it remains to be seen how much its influence will spread. Should it spread to other areas in the Bohai Rim or across the country, I can only hope that they adapt the lessons learned at Caofeidian to the unique conditions of the new sites. I know that for you, the reader, this may be getting repetitive, but I feel I cannot stress enough the importance of looking at the local site factors in creating a sustainable city. The KPIs, if they are to be effective, must consider these to determine how each plot can meet its targets and how the city as a whole can achieve carbon neutrality. Simply taking the blueprints for Caofeidian and dropping them in, say, Beijing would not work and would only lead to a negative impression of eco-cities in the affected region. Instead, if Caofeidian gets replicated, it must be the ideas and the processes of development that are replicated (and maybe a few technologies) but not the city blueprint at large.
Conclusion
A comparison of Tangshan and Caofeidian, at least based on the available press releases and information, reveals examples of how and how not to develop an eco-city. On the one hand, Caofeidian has incorporated a strong intergovernmental partnership with key indicators for planners, contractors, and operators to ensure the success of its carbon neutral city. A few kilometers down the road, its sister Tangshan has engaged a foreign developer to try and bring new ideas into the city but has yet to express succinctly its full development plan or address issues of transportation, holistic planning, and emissions accounting. It lacks an indicator framework and instead relies on its proximity to South Lake to uphold its ecological claims. If there is a one out of the two we should hope succeeds and look to for replication, it is certainly Caofeidian. Tangshan is interesting for its reclamation of South Lake, but in its haste to parlay that success into a broader acclaim for an eco-city, it failed to incorporate holistic planning. Therefore while we may learn a thing or two about brownfield redevelopment from Tangshan, it is ultimately Caofeidian which both reclaimed former industrial land and implemented a comprehensive sustainability management plan for the site which should be our urban model. Now we just have to wait 10 years until completion to see if it actually succeeds and lives up to its green dreams.
[1] Tangshan Case Study, 2010 Shanghai World Expo Promotional Material.
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1976_Tangshan_earthquake
[3] http://www.stadtbauatelier.de/index.php/files/index.php?article_id=94&fachbereich=1&projektnr=347
[4] http://www.worldarchitecturenews.com/index.php?fuseaction=wanappln.projectview&upload_id=12246
[5] http://www.yanlordland.com/en/news_center2.asp?id=501
[6] http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3916-From-sham-to-reality?utm_source=Chinadialogue+Update&utm_campaign=c06e47c617-newsletter+01+Nov+2010&utm_medium=email
[7] http://wildsingaporenews.blogspot.com/2010/08/greenwashed-are-chinas-eco-cities.html
[8] http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/cwml6jul10.pdf
[9] http://www.swedenvirotech.se/en/Business-opportunities/Cities-and-policies/Tangshan-Caofeidian/
[10] http://www.sida.se/Global/About%20Sida/Konferenser/Green%20Solutions/Harnosand%20CFD%20PPT_2010.5.18.pdf
[11] http://www.southernswedenexpo.cn/news/malmo-and-tangshan-enter-unique-partnership-sustainable-urban-development
[12] http://www.swecogroup.com/en/Sweco-group/Solutions/Sustainable-City/The-new-Caofeidian-eco-city-will-be-climate-neutral/
[13] http://www.robroad.com/industry/index.php/city-caofeidian-eco-energy/
[14] http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/28/content_10729346.htm
[15] http://international.stockholm.se/PageFiles/196622/L_Peng.pdf
[16] http://newurbanquestion.ifou.org/proceedings/4%20Urban%20Technologies%20and%20Sustainability/full%20papers/C023_Ma_Qiang_Eco-city%20and%20%20Eco-Planning%20in%20China-Taking%20An%20Example%20for%20Caofeidian%20Eco-city.pdf
[17] http://en.tangshan.gov.cn/newsshow.asp?id=523
What are the latest advances in Enhanced Geothermal Systems? Has there been significant progress of late in their successes?
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